





PROGRESS OF THE LAW.-
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS' FOR MAY.
Edited by AP~xuis STswART.
A hotel-keeper, in whose safe a regular boarder deposits
money for safe keeping, is no more than a bailee for him, and
Bailment, when the money is stolen from the safe by his
Hotel-keeper night clerk, is not liable therefor, in the absence
of any proof of want of ordinary care in employing him:
Taylor v. Downey, (Supreme Court of Michigan,) 6z N. W.
Rep. 716.
When the proprietor of a hotel employs a servant to
receive and keep the property of guests while at meals, his
liability for the default of this servant in the custody of prop-
erty so received is not affected by the fact that he has also
provided a check-room for the safe-keeping of such property:
Labold v. Southern Hotel Co., 54 Mo. App. 567.
As the Australian Ballot Law only provides for the form of
ballots used at elections of officers,-the form of ballot pre-
Ballots, scribed by another statute for use at a special
Special election to determine the amount of a liquor license
Elections is not affected by the former act: State v. City of
Janesville, (Supreme Court of Wisconsin,) 62 N. W. Rep. 933.
The Australian Ballot Law of Pennsylvania, (June Io, 1893,
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P. L. 419, § i4,) does not repeal the acts providing a method
and a ballot for an election on the question of increasing the
debt of a township; the former section applies only to state
questions: Evans v. Willistown Township, 3 D. R. 395. But
the Ballot Law of Illinois, (June 22, I89i, § i6,) which.pre-
scribes the form of ballot for an election on the adoption of
"a constitutional amendment or other ptblic measure," has
been held to repeal all other laws prescribing ballots and
modes of voting in questions relating to municipal affairs:
County of Union v. Ussery, 147 Ill. 204; S. C., 35 N. E. Rep.
618.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, in Woodsy. McNerney, 63 N. W. Rep. 23, (i) The
Arrangement officer charged with the preparation of the official
of Names ballot is given discretion in regard to the arrange-
ment of tle names, &c., so far as is not inconsistent with the
spirit and purpose of the law, which discretion will not be
interfered with by the court; and therefore (2) When. the
officer, in preparing the ballot, arranged the names of certain
candidates, nominated by two parties, on single lines, thus:
FOR LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR.
JAmS N. GAFFIN, of Colon. Democrat and People's Independent.
le could not be mandamused to arrange them thus:
FOR LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR.
JA.MdEs N. GAF IN. J People's Independent.I Democrat.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has lately" ruled, that under
the Australian Ballot Law of that state, (June 22, 1891, P. L.
Additional io8,) which provides that voting shall be by ballots
Names printed and distributed at public expense, that no
other ballots shall be used, and that the voter shall prepare his
ballot by making a cross opposite the name of the candidate
of his choice, or by writing in the name of the candidate of his
choice in a blank space on said ticket, and making a cross
opposite thereto, voters are not confined to the names printed
on the official ballot, but may write thereon the name of any
person for whom they wish to vote, and vote for that person:
Sanner v. Patton, 40 N. E. Rep. 290.
PROGRESS OIF THE LAW;
The -same court has also held, 'that When several
independent candidates, nominiated by petition, were plated
in one column dn the official ballot, headed
Marking " Citizen's Ticket," a voter, who marked the circle
opposite that heading, voted -for all the candidates fif that
column: 3furpIy v. Battle, 40 N. E. Rep. 470.
In a recent case in the Supreme Court of Montana, Stack-
pole v. Hallahan, 40 Pac. Rep. So, the person nominated by
a political convention as a candidate for the officeSubstituted
Nomination, of county treasurer sent his declination to the
Certificate central committee, and no certificate of his nomi-
nation was ever filed with the county clerk. The committee,
being empowered to fill vacancies on the ticket, nominated
another candidate. The certificate of this second nomination
failed to show the name of the person for whom such candi-
date was substituted, the cause of the vacancy, that he was
nominated to fill a vacancy, or that the central committee had
power to fill such vacancy. But as no objection on these
grounds was made until after the election, the fairness of which
was not questioned, the court held: (r) That the provis-
ions of the Australian Ballot Law of that state, prescribing the
facts to be stated in the certificate of nomination, and the
manner in which a nomination may be declined, and the
resulting vacancy filled, should not, under such circumstances,
be held mandatory; and therefore, (2) The election was not
invalid, though the statute requires that a candidate declining
a nomination shall so notify the officer with whow his certifi-
cate of nomination is filed, in writing, and that the certificate
of the nomination made to fill the vacancy shall state the
cause of the vacancy . ..... the name of the person for
whom the new nominee is to be substituted, and the fact that
the committee was authorized to fill vacancies.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has just
decided, that the statute of that state adopting the Australian
Ballot System, (Act of March 6, 1894,) is consti-Voting,
Limitation of tutional, though it contains a provision that the
Time time" within which the elector must prepare his
ballot shall be limited to two minutes and a half: Pearson v.
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Board of Supervisors of Brunswick Co., 21 S. E. Rep. 483.
In the same case it was also held that in a provision that a
sworn special constable, therein provided for "may" render
Assistance assistance in preparing the ballot to an elector
to Voter physically or educationally unable to vote, the
word "may" is mandatory.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Lem MAfoon
Chinese Sing v. United States, not yet reported, has
Exclusion decided, that the decision of the immigration
Law, officers in regard to the exclusion of an alien is
Decision of
Custom conclusive, unless appealed from to the Secretary
Officers of the Treasury, as provided by law, and cannot
be reviewed by the courts orl habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has recently held, in
accord with the weight of authority, (i) That the courts.
have jurisdiction to decide as to the constitution-
ti ., ality of a legislative apportionment, though the
Apportion- question involves only political rights; and (2),
ment That under a constitutional provision (Const. Ill.
Art. 4, § 6,) which provides that "senatorial districts shall be
formed of contiguous and compact territory, bounded by
county lines, and containing, as nearly as practicable, an equal.
number of inhabitants, but no district shall contain less than
four-fifths of a senatorial ratio," an apportionment act is valid,
which bounds the districts by county lines, and creates no dis-
trict containing less than four-fifths of the ratio, though it
applies the rule of compactness to only a limited extent: Peo..
v. Thompson, 4q N. E. Rep. 307.
In general, any gross violation of the constitutional require-
ments will render an apportionment act invalid: e. g., a greater
number of representatives than allowed by the constitution
cannot be allotted: State v. Francis, 26 Kans. 724; if the
constitution forbids the division of a county or district, an
apportionment act which violates that prohibition is void: State
v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 44o; S. C., 5 1 N. W. Rep. 724; and
if there are any glaring inequalities of population or repre-.
36o
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.sentation, these will be taken as a sure indication that the
legislature has transgressed the bounds of its discretion: Peo.
v. Canadaj', 73 N. C. 198 ; Board of Supervisors of County of
Houghton v. Blacker, 92 Mich. 638; S. C.. 52 N. W. Rep.
951 ; Giddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich. i; S. C., 52 N.W. Rep.
944; State v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 9o; S.C., 53 N.W. Rep.
35; Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178; S. C., 32 N. E. Rep. 836;
33 N. E. Rep. ii; Ballentine v, Willey, 2 Idaho, I2O8; S.C.,
31 Pac. Rep. 994. See State v. Wrightson, 56 N. J. L. 126.
The only case to the contrary is Peo. v. Rice, 135 N. Y.
473 ; S. C., 31 N. E. Rep. 92 1, which is discussed in 31 AMi.
L. REG. 85I etseq. When, however, the discretion of the
apportioning power is properly exercised, as in the Illinois case,
the apportionment is valid, though not mathematically exact:
State v. Campbell, 48 Ohio St. 435; S. C., 27 N. E. Rep. 884.
The same rules apply to an apportionment made by a
subordinate body in which that power is vested: Peo. v. Board
of Supervisors of Kings County, 138 N. Y. 95 ; S. C., 33 N.
E. Rep. 827; reversing 20 N.Y. Suppl. 470; In re Baird,
142 N. Y. 523 ; S. C., 37 N. E. Rep. 619; affirming 75 Hun,
545; S. C., 27 N. Y. Suppi. 535: In re Whitney, 142 N. Y,
531; S. C., 37 N. E. Rep. 621; affirming.75 Hun, 581;
S. C., 27 N. Y. Suppl. 657.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, an Act which declares that "no female shall be
fours of employed in any factory or workshop more than
Labor eight hours in any one day, or forty-eight hours in
any one week, is unconstitutional, on the ground that it
deprives persons of property and liberty without due process
of law: Ritchie v. Peo., 40 N. E. Rep. 454.
A statute authorizing grand jurors, when assembled to
investigate offences, to require a justice to commit to jail wit-
Summary nesses who refuse to answer proper questions, is
Conviction not unconstitutional, on the ground that it author-
izes the exercise of a judicial power by the executive depart-
ment; nor on the ground that the recalcitrant witness is
deprived of his liberty without due process of law; and the
justice niay commit such a witness, when required, without 4
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regular trial and judgment: In re Clark, (Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut,) 31 Atl. Rep. 522.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has lately
ruled, that when an accomodation note, given by the plaintiff
to a corporation, was discounted, and not paid atContract,
Promissory maturity; and the defendant, who was a stock-
Note, holder, director and creditor of the corporation,
Consideration
in consideration of the plaintiff's advancing him
money to pay the note, gave the plaintiff his note for the
amount advanced; that the defendant's note was supported
by a valid consideration: Abbott v. Doane, 40 N. E. Rep. 197.
According to the Supreme Court of Texas, a combination
of dealers in beer, which secured control, by lease, of "all the
Restraint cooling-room capacity for cooling beer" in a town,
of Trade so that competition in the sale of beer would be
kept out, is a combination in restraint of trade, and unlawful,
under the statutes of that state, and the parties to it cannot
recover for a breach of a contract, the performance of which
would have enabled them to carry out their unlawful enter-
prise: Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn. v. Houck, 30 S. W. Rep.
869, affirming 27 S.W. Rep. 692.
The Supreme Court of Montana has recently held, that when
the by-laws of a corporation authorize the trustees or directors
Corporations, thereof to employ a superintendent, and fix his
Directors, salary, a trustee, who is also secretary of the cor-
Compensation poration, may recover on an implied contract for
services rendered as superintendent, if such services are clearly
outside his ordinary duties as secretary or trustee, and are
performed under circumstances showing that it was well
understood by the officers of the corporation, as well as by
himself, that they were to be paid for: Felton v. West Iron
Mountain Mining Co., 4o Pac. Rep. 70.
According to a late opinion of the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware, a corporation is not a citizen, within the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, securing to a citi-Foreign
Corporations, zen of any state the rights, privileges and immuni-
Comity ties guaranteed to the citizens of the several states;:
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and that therefore the usage of interstate comity does not
warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel a
domestic corporation to aid a foreign corporation, whose
operations are expressly limited by its charter to the state
where it was incorporated, to conduct its business in another
state: State v. Del. & AMI. Telegraph & Telephone Co., 31 Atl.
Rep. 714.
In a case recently decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, Zachry v. Xolan, 66 Fed. Rep. 467, the
Stock, plaintiff gave to the defendants an option for thirty
Option to days, in writing, to lease certain stock in a corpo-
Lease, ration owned by her, and at the same time. gave
Proxy Voting
them a proxy to vote on the stock. At a stock-
holders' meeting, held within the thirty days, the defendants
offered to vote on the stock, and their right to do so being
challenged, exhibited the proxy and the option as proof of
their right, which proof was accepted, and their votes received.
The plaintiff afterwards sued the defendants for the rent of the
stock, specified in the option. as upon accounts stated, claim-
ing that their acts in voting on the stock constituted an accept-
ance of the option. The trial court charged that these acts
were an acceptance of the option ; but the Court of Appeals
held that this was error, and that the question was one for the
jury to decide.
A verdict of guilty in a criminal case, set aside on the ground
Criminal Law, that it was contrary to the evidence, does not
Former Conviction, constitute a bar to a subsequent trial under
Bar the same indictment: State v. Bowman,
(Supreme Court ef Iowa,) 62 N. W. Rep. 759.
When a judgment, entered upon a verdict of guilty as
charged in the indictment, on a trial of an indictment for
murder, has been reversed on writ of error, because the
verdict did not ascertain the degree of the crime, and a new
trial has been awarded, the accused can be tried again upon
the same indictment, and the second trial will not put him in
jeopardy a second time for the same offence, within the mean-
ing of the constitution: Lovett v. State, 33 Fla. 389; S. C., 14
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So. Rep. 837. So, when, on appeal, a new trial is granted in
a criminal case, on the ground that the judge below erred in
submitting the case to the jury when there was not sufficient
evidence to warrant it, thedefendant cannot, on the new trial,
plead former acquittal, for he was convicted in the court
below, and the granting of a new trial is not an acquittal, nor
can he plead former conviction, for it was set aside, and a new
trial granted: State v. Rhodes, 112 N. C. 857; S. C.,
17 S. E. Rep. 164. But the fact that an appeal is pending
will not deprive the defendant of the bar, when the judgment
is otherwise sufficient: United States v. Olsen, 57 Fed. Rep.
579-
The same rules apply when a verdict of guilty is set aside
by the trial court, in its discretion, and a new trial granted; in
such a case the plea of former jeopardy cannot be sustained:
State v. Lee, (N. C.) i S. E. Rep. 375 ; State v. Benzjamin,
(La.) 14 So. Rep. 71.
Again, a conviction of murder, set aside at the instance of
the defendant because of a defect in the information, is no
bar to a subsequent trial and conviction for the same offence,
in a new and valid information: Peo. v. Schmidt, 64 Cal. 260;
S. C., 30 Pac. Rep. 814. A plea of former jeopardy to a
persecution for arson, is not sustained by proof that there had
been a mistrial, and that afterwards a new indictment was
returned, either because the former indictment had been lost,
or because the name of the owner of the property destroyed
had been erroneously stated: Thompson v. Commonwealth,
(Ky.) 25 S. W. Rep. 1059.
Similarly if, for any reason, the verdict is void, it cannot be
set up as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same
offence. Thus, the trial and conviction of a defendant in a
federal court, which. had no jurisdiction of the offence, will not
bar a prosecution in the state court for the same offence:
Blyew v. Commonwealth, 91 Ky. 200. And when one of the
trial justices is related to the defendant within the prohibited
degrees, and the conviction is set aside on that ground, and a
new trial ordered, the former conviction is no bar to the second
trial : Peo. v. Connor, 142 N. Y. 130; S. C., 36 N. E. Rep.
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So7; affirming 20 N. Y. Suppl. 209; S. C., 65 Hun. 392;
8 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 439.
But when the jury separates, after rendering a void verdict,
the defendant, having been once in jeopardy, is entitled to be
discharged, and cannot be tried again: Jackson v. State,
,(Ala.) 15 So. Rep. 351 ; and when the defendant is convicted
of a lower offence than that charged in the indictment, which
involves an acquittal of the higher offence, the fact that the
-conviction of the lower offence was set aside, and a new trial
granted, at the instance of the defendant, will not entitle the
state to place him on trial again for the higher offence: Peo. v.
Gordon, 99 Cal. 227; S. C., 33 Pac. Rep. 9oi.
One who, by false pretences, obtains goods ordered from a
•Critrinal Law, salesman, may be tried in the county from which
Venue the principal shipped them: Co;monwealthi v.
Karpowski, (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,) 31 Atl. Rep. 572.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in a very able and
*learned opinion, has recently decided, that when a testator, in
Devise, devising his estate in trust, provided 
that when
.Rule Against the youngest of his grandchildren, born and
Perpetuitles, unborn, should arrive at the age of forty years,
Cypres the residue of the estate should be theirs,-that
.the invalidity of the devise to the grandchildren, as in violation
of the rule against perpetuities, would not defeat it, but, under
the doctrine of cy pres, the state would be allowed to vest in
them, when the youngest reached the age of twenty-one:
_a.gerly v. Barker, 31 Ad. Rep. 900.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, threats
-of prosecution and immediate imprisonment of the husband
are sufficient to constitute duress, when used toDuress,
Threat to induce a man and his wife to execute and deliver
.Prosecute a mortgage upon their homestead, to secure the
payment of a judgment against him, if they so overcome the
wills of the mortgagors as to induce them to sign the mort-
gage, and thus execute a security which they would not have
,executed.voluntarily; and the instrument so obtained is void:
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Hargreaves v. Korcek, 62 N. W. Rep. io86. See i Aii. L..
REG. & REv. (N. S.) 885.
A person who rides on the footboard of an electric street
car is not required to anticipate danger from the close prox-
Electric Railways, imity of trolley poles to the track; and therefore
Poles, his failure to listen for warnings, to watch out
Contributory
Negligence for such poles, given by the conductor, does
not render him guilty of contributory negligence: Elliott v.
Newport St. Ry. Co., (Supreme Court of Rhode Island,) 3 1
Atl. Rep. 694.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Oregon, equity has no jurisdiction, on the ground of avoiding
Equity, a multiplicity of suits, of a suit to recover the
Jurisdiction, several amounts due on a contract whereby the•Multiplicity of
Suits defendants, in consideration of the assignment of
the several interests of the plaintiffs in an option on a mine,
were to refund to each plaintiff the amount already advanced
by him to develop the mine: Van Auken v. Dammeier, 4o Pac.
Rep. 89.
The Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
has lately held, in Holton v. Wallace, 66 Fed. Rep. 409, that
Pleading a bill in equity, which sets up; (i) An allegcd
Multifariousness liability to a corporation of one person as an
assignee of unpaid stock, and an alleged joint liability with
him of five others, by reason of collusion with him to defraud
creditors of the corporation; and (2) An alleged liability of
five of the same defendants for fraudulent conduct in connec-
tion with a sale of the railroad belonging to the corporation ;-
is multifarious, as the two causes of action are distinct, pre-
senting independent cases for relief, and require different proofs
and different decrees.
According to the Supreme Court of Michigan, when the
plaintiff in an action for injuries resulting in death has intro-
duced the mortality tables in evidence, and offersEvidence,
Life Tables, no other evidence to show that the probability of
Effect life of his decedent was greater or less than that.
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shown by the tables, it is error to charge that the tables were
not controlling, but should be given just such weight as the
jury think proper: Velson v. Lake Shore & N. S. Ry. Co.,
62 N. W. Rep. 993.
This, however, can only be true, if even when the verdict,
as in this case, is so large as to show conclusively that the
tables were disregarded altogether. When there is any other
evidence in the case, bearing on the question, the tables are to
be taken in connection with that: City of Joliet v. Brewer,
(Supreme Court of Illinois,) 4o N. E. Rep. 619. See 2 AM.
L. REG. & REv. (N. S.) 217; 36 Cent. L. J. 75.
A dentist is not a surgeon, within the meaning of the
Privileged Michigan statute, (How. St. § 75 I6,) and there-
Communications, fore communications made to him by a patient
Dentist are not privileged: Peo. v. DeFrance, (Supreme
Court of Michigan,) 62 N. W. Rep. 709.
The Supreme Court of Washington has lately ruled, in
Wooding v. Puget Sound Natl. Bank, 40 Pac. Rep. 223,
Garnishment, (I) That when a sheriff finds on the person of a
Stolen prisoner a package of money, obtained by fraud
Property from a bank, and the prisoner's mother voluntarily
surrenders other packages similarly obtained, and each package
is stamped with the name of the bank from which it was
received, the sheriff may, with the consent of the parties from
whom he took it, take possession of the money, and restore
the same to the bank claiming it; and (2) That when money
is taken from a person without his cbnsent, by a person who
acts as a trespasser in so doing, and is delivered by him to a
third person who claims title thereto, it is not subject to
garnishment in the hands of the sheriff, or of the parties to
whom he delivered it, as the property of the person from whom
it was taken.
In a recent case, Stewart v. Thomson, not yet reported, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky has reasserted theInJunction, dcrn
Property familiar doctrine that a court of equity will enjoin
Fraudulently proceedings on an attachment, fraudulently levied
in another state, on property temporarily there, in
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order to evade the exemption laws of the state of the defend-
ant's residence.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has recently held, that in
order to sustain the finding of a jury that a building destroyed
Insurance, by fire was a "total loss." it is not necessary that
Total Loss the evidence should show that the material of
which the building was composed was reduced by the fire to
smoke, cinders and ashes. It is sufficient if the building is
rendered practically valueless as a building: Ins. Co. of North
America v. Bachler, 62 N. W. Rep. 91 I.
A total loss does not mean an absolute destruction; and in
reference to a building, the question is not whether all the
parts and materials composing it are absolutely destroyed, but
whether, after the fire, the thing insured exists as a building:
Williams v. Hartford Ins. Co., 54 Cal. 442.
When all the combustible material in a building is destroyed
by fire, although portions of the brick walls are left standing,
but so injured by the fire that they must be torn down, for the
purpose of insurance the property is totally destroyed, but if
the person insured should use the brick or other material not
destroyed to rebuild, the company would be entitled to the
value of the brick or other material: German Ins. Co. of
Fyeeport v. Eddy, 36 Neb. 461; S. C., 54 N. W. Rep. 856.
In a recent case in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
Bradford v. Bole),, 167 Pa. 5o6; S. C., 31 Atl. Rep. 751,
Intoxicating several interesting phases of the Civil Damage Law
Liquors, were discussed, and their legal effect determined.
Civil Damage,
Imprisonment It was decided, (i) That the interest of a wife in
of Husband her husband's earning power is not "property,"
within the meaning of the Civil Damage Act of Pennsylvania,
(May 8, 1854, P. L. 663, § 3,) which declares that one who
unlawfully furnishes intoxicating drinks to another shall be
liable for injury to person or property occasioned by the furn-
ishing; and she cannot therefore recover damages because of
the imprisonment of her husband for an act committed while
intoxicated :
(2) That the unlawful negligence of a liquor dealer in sell-
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ing to an intoxicated person is not the proximate cause
Proximate of the imprisonment of the latter for an act
Cause committed while he was intoxicated. The law
intervenes, and becomes the proximate cause:
(3) That when *a husband, on receiving his wages, was
accustomed to deposit them with his wife, for family use and
Contributory for safe-keeping, and then, when about to go on a
Negligence spree, or during one, would apply to her for
money to carry it on, she cannot be charged with contributory
negligence in letting him have money from the deposit, so as
to prevent her recovering damages from a liquor dealer for
injuries caused by his unlawful furnishing of liquor to her
husband, even though she knew his purpose when she let him
have the money.
The Supreme Court of New York, First Department, has
recently decided, that under the statute of that state, (Laws,
License Laws, 1892, C. 602,) providing for the examination and
Examinaion: licensing of master plumbers, the decision of the
Review examining board in refusing to grant a license
cannot be sustained, when it does not appear that rules of
examination had been adopted, prescribing the subjects, and
stating the percentage of questions which must be answered
correctly. to entitle the applicant to a certificate; and that a
retarn to a certiorari to review the decision of the board is
insufficient, which simply sets forth the questions asked the
relator, and the answers made by him, without alleging that
any of the answers were incorrect, and showing wherein they
were incorrect: Peo. v. Scott, 33 N. Y. Suppl. 229.
In a dissenting opinion in the case of Blozqzist v. Chicago,
Xl. & St. P. Ry. Co., 62 N. W. Rep. 818, Judge CANTY, of the
Mlaster and Supreme Court of Minnesota, has laid down,
Servant, according to the syllabus prepared by the court,
Vice Principal "some novel and interesting principles by which
to determine when the superior servant is a vice principal as
to the inferior servant." These principles are an attempt to
take a position on the vice principal question intermediate
between the two extreme views on that subject which at
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present prevail; and will probably, with some slight modifica-.
tions form the rule as finally adopted. Judge CANTY'S position,
stated in his own words, is this: "It is held by a number of
courts that the mere fact that the superior servant has power
to hire, discharge and direct the inferior servant is alone
sufficient to constitute the superior servant a vice principal as
to the inferior servant; but it seems to me that it should
require something more to give the superior servant that
character. It is often the case that the inferior servant is
more familiar than such foreman with the dangers to which he
is exposed, and is better able to protect himself from those
dangers than the foreman is to protect him; and yet without
his fault, and by reason of exposure to those dangers, he may
be injured through the negligence of the foreman. When the
inferior servant knows and appreciates the dangers to be
avoided, and is as well, or nearly as well, able to care for him-
self as the foreman is to care for him, he is substantially on an
equal footing with the foreman, and in a better position than
the master to look out for his own safety. In such a case the
foreman is not a vice principal, but he and the inferior servant
are fellow servants. On the other hand, when the servant
does not know or does not appreciate the danger to be avoided
and from his grade or position cannot be expected to know or
appreciate such danger, while a competent foreman should.be
required so to do, it is not good public policy to hold that the
master is not liable for the negligence of the foreman, resulting
in injury to the servant. It is very often the case that the
prosecution of the work requires a very high degree of skill
and experience in the foreman, and but little skill or experience
in the inferior servant, who is neither hired nor paid to exercise
the skill necessary for his own protection. If the position of
the foreman is one which requires of him superior knowledge
or skill, which cannot be required or expected of the inferior
servant, but which is necessary for the protection of such
inferior servant, then, in regard to the exercise of such superior
knowledge or skill" the foreman is a vice principal. There
must be something more in the inequality of the foreman and
inferior servant than that which results -alone from the one
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having the authority to hire, discharge, and oversee the other.
It is the actual disparity or inequality between them which
should control, and the disparity which gives the foreman the
character of vice principal must be substantial, not merely
slight As far as I am able to discover, after much investiga-
tion, there are but two kinds of this disparity: (i) Disparity
of knowledge; and (2) disparity of skill. Disparity of knowl-
edge is where the foreman has or should have knowledge
which the inferior servant neither has nor can be expected
to have, the want of which knowledge on the part of such
servant causes or contributes to his injury. Disparity of skill
-is where the foreman has or should have skill which the
inferior servant neither has nor can be expected to have, the
want of which skill on the part of such servant causes or con-
-tributes to his injury. The existence of such disparity of
either or both kinds is a question of fact for the jury, and the
burden is on the party asserting such disparity to prove it."
This is true, if it be modified by saying, that these facts,
disparity of knowledge and disparity of skill, are to be taken
in connection with the fact of the authority possessed by the
foreman; and not as controlling the decision of the question,
independent of the latter. It must also be understood that
-disparity of knowledge refers not to theoretical knowledge,
but to practical knowledge of the conditions under which the
inferior servant is then working. With these modifications,
these rules are far preferable to any yet laid down for deter-
.mining this vexed question.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has recently held,
that a member of the fire department is not an employe of
the taxpayer of the municipality by which he isNegligence,
Licensee, employed, in such a sense as to create an implied
Fireman invitation f-om them to enter their premises to
extinguish fires, so as to render them liable for personal
injuries suffered by him in consequence of the dangerous
condition of the premises, in a case where liability therefor
would not otherwise exist: Bet,'e v. Daniels, 3 i Atl. Rep.
582.
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The Court of Appeals of New York, in Peo. v. Rathibone,
4o N. E. Rep. 395, has affirmed the decision of the Supreme
Officer, Court, reported in 32 N. Y. Suppl. io8, that a
Notary Public,
Free Pass notary public is a public officer, within a constitu-
tional provision that any public officer, elected or appointed
to a public office, who shall travel on a free pass, shall forfeit
his office.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, a provision in partnership articles that the'salaries
Partnership, of the members shall not be considered as losses
Salary sustained by the business, entitles a partner to his
salary unconditionally; and therefore, when a partner left the
monthly instalments of his salary in the hands of the firm, to
be used for its benefit, he is entitled, in settling the partner-
ship accounts, to interest on the several instalments from the
time each became payable to him: Kelley v. Turner, 31 Atl.
Rep. 700.
The Supreme Court of the United States has lately
ruled, that when the rights under a patent have been
Patents, assigned to different persons for different states, a
Territorial dealer in one state may purchase the patented
Assignments,
Rights articles of the assignee for another state, for the
thereunder purpose of resale in his (the dealer's) state, and
may sell them there without liability to the assignee for that
state: Keeler v. Standard Folding-bed CO., 15 Sup. Ct. Rep.
738. Chief Justice FULLER, and Justices BROWN and FIELD,
dissented.
According to the Supreme Court of Montana, under an
act which provides that the board in which rests the power of
Public Contracts, allotting public contracts shall contract with the
Mandamus lowest responsible bidders therefor, the board
has discretionary powers, and mandamus does not lie to
compel it to award a contract to a bidder who, although the
lowest, is, in its j udgment, not responsible: State v. Rickards,
40 Pac. Rep. 210.
A provision that a public contract shall be awarded to the
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"lowest responsible bidder," is mandatory; but in ascertain-
ing whether or not a bidder is responsible, the awarding body
is required to deliberate and decide; in so doing its members
exercise judicial functions; and therefore, however erroneous
their decision may be, they cannot be compelled by man-
damus to alter their determination : Hoole v. Kinkcad, 16
Nev. 21 7 ; Coommonwealth v. Jitchell, 82 Pa. 343 ; Dou,-lass
v. Commonwealth, io8 Pa. 559 ; Kell, v. Chicago, 62 Ill. 279;
Peo. v. Dorsheimer, 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.) i 18. The same is
true, when the board, though it has a rule to accept the lowest
and best bid, reserves the right to reject any or all bids:
Anderson v. Board, (Mo.) 27 S. W. Rep. 6io. There is a full
discussion of this subject in i Ai. L. REG. & REv. (N. S.) 899.
But when, by statute or charter, a public contract is to be
awarded to the lowest bidder, " who shall give satisfactory
proof of his or their ability to furnish the requisite
Discretion materials and perform the work properly," the
determination of the question as to who is the lowest bidder
does not rest upon the exercise of an arbitrary, unlimited dis-
cretion by the board or official who is to award the contract,
bu'z upon the exercise of a bona fide judgment, based upon
facts tending reasonably to the support of that determination.
There must be a rational basis of fact to support this deter-
m'nation; but if this exists, the court will not weigh disputed
evidence and facts in order to review the action of the award-
ing power: State v. Board of Public Works of City of Trenton,
(Supreme Court of New Jersey,) 31 Atl. Rep. 613.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Pounder v. Ash, 63
N. W. Rep. 48, has just decided a very interesting case on the
Religious subject of the conclusiveness of the decrees of an
Societies, ecclesiastical tribunal acting within the bounds ofRules of
Government, its authority, and the power of the courts of
ResJudicata, law to enforce such decrees by appropriate pro-
Enforcement
by ceedings. It held, overruling its former decision,
Courts of Law in 36 Neb. 564; S. C., 54 N. W. Rep. 847, that
when charges have been preferred against a minister of the
gospel, and he has been adjudged guilty by the highest
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tribunal of the church organization before which the matter
has been presented, has been deposed from the ministry, and
expelled from membership in the church, the courts of law
will recognize such a judgment of the church tribunal, and
enforce its observance, when regularly brought to their notice;
and in an action for the purpose, will enjoin the one against
whom it was rendered from further acting in the capacity of a
minister, or enjoying the rights of a member of the particular
church organization; and, when it further appears that the
church property was conveyed to the organization or its
trustees for church purposes, and in such a manner that it is
subject to the control of the general association or governing
power of the church, and its rules and laws, will also enjoin
,such person and member of the local congregation, or any
others who have combined with him, from excluding from
the church building and property, and from its use for any
proper purpose, or from disturbing, in or during such use, a.ny
parties or ministers appointed to take charge of the congrega-
tion and church, by the then recognized and appointive power,
disclosed to be such by the evidence in the case, or in so
excluding and disturbing a presiding elder of the church from
or in its proper occupancy or use, or any- members in good
standing who desire to worship therein in a regular manner,
and according to the established rules and ordinances of the
church.
A vote on proposed amendments to a church constitution
cannot be adjudged invalid, on a collateral attack in ejectment
Elections, between adverse factions of a church to recover
Ballots church property, on the ground that the ballots
indicated unfairness, in that all contained the word "Yes,"
with directions that those voting in the negative must erase
that word, and insert the word "No:" Russie v. Bravzell,
(Supreme Court of Missouri,) 30 S. W. Rep. 526.
The constitution of a religious society, adopted by the
general conference and acquiesced in for forty years, though
constitution, never submitted to or ratified by the members of
Amendments the society, and never fully recognized by the
body of the church, nevertheless is the paramount law of the
PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
society. and can be changed or repealed only as provided by
the constitution itself, not by the conference or legislative body
by which it was adopted: Russie v. Brazzell, (Supreme Court
of Missouri,) 30 S. W. Rep. 526.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has reached substantially the
same result, in Kins v. Robcrtsoll, 4o N. E. Rep. 343.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in State v. Werzwag,
21 S. E. Rep. 683, has lafely rendered a decision that seems
hardly just. A city ordinance prohibited the sale
of fresh meats within certain limits, without license.
The manager of a hotel within the limit sent a telephone mes-
sage to a butcher who lived outside the limit, ordering him to
bring some fresh meats* to the hotel, at prices- agreed on.
Accordingly, the butcher brought the meats to the hotel in his
own wagon, and delivered them, receiving payment afterwards.
This was held a violation of the ordinance, on the ground that
the telephone order was executory, and the sale was consum-
mated only upon delivery. The decision is supported by the
following acute reasoning: "The plain meaning of the matter
is this: The hotel manager sent a message to a seller of meats
outside of the three-fourths mile limit. 'Bring me some
fresh meats of a certain description. If they are such as I
order, I will take them, and pay you for them; if they are not
of the kind I order, I will not.' Surely, there is no sale in
this."
Why not? It is true, that when the sale is completed only
by delivery, it is to be regarded as made at the place of delivery:
Doster v. State, 18 S. E. Rep. 997; or if delivered to a common
carrier, that delivery is regarded as a constructive delivery to
the buyer, and the sale is then complete: State v. Flanagan,
38 W.Va. 53. But it is difficult to see the reason for the dis-
tinction. The carrier is, to some extent at least, the agent of the
seller, for the latter has the right of stoppage in transitu, which
is often far more effective in its results than his absolute right of
recall over his own delivery wagon would be. The rule has
been adopted to make more efficient the laws restricting the
liquor traffic; but however laudable the object, that alone is
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no excuse for the exercise of a power that belongs properly to
the legislature. Whatever the rights of the parties, the sale is
either complete when the offer of one party is accepted by the
other, or else not until the payment is made; and no merely
utilitarian considerations can authorize the courts to fix it
arbitrarily at the intermediate point of delivery.
The Exchequer Division of Ireland has recently held, that
when the owner of a house allowed his sisters to
Statute of
Limitations, reside therein, contributed to their support, paid
Adverse the rent and taxes, and executed all necessary
Possession
repairs, their occupation was in the character of
guests and not of tenants at will, and therefore the statute of
limitations did not run against the owner: Pcakin v. Peakin,.
[1895] 2,1r. R. 359.
The Supreme Court of Nevada has ruled, (i) That when
the title of an act states that its subject is to amend one
Statutes, section of a former statute, the act cannot be
Amendments, extended to the amendment of other sections;
Constitutionality but (2) If the sections of such an act, which
attempt to amend other sections of a prior act than that.
mentioned in the title, are so separate and independent that
one section can be made to operate in accordance with the
intention of the legislature without the aid of the others, and
the invalid sections have not constituted any inducement for
the first, that section should be sustained, though the other-
sections are unconstitutional: Exparte Hewlett, 40 Pac. Rep. 96.
According to the Supreme Court of Ohio, since an
amended section of a statute takes the place of the original
section, and must be construed with reference to the other
sections, and they with reference to it, and since the whole
statute, after the amendment, has the same effect as if re-en-
acted with the amendment, an unconstitutional statute may be
amended into a constitutional one, so far as its future operation
is concerned, by removing its objectionable provisions, or
supplying others, so as to make it conform to the requirements
of the constitution: State v. Citj, of Cincinnati, 40 N. E. Rep..
508.
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In a recent case in the Supreme Court of Michigan, Drapcr
-v. Askley', 62 N. IN". Rep. 707, a first mortgage of land had
been foreclosed, without making the second mort-
Subrogation,
To Rights of gagee a party to the suit. The first bought in
Mortgagee the land; but, before the equity of redemption
expired, quitclaimed the land to the mortgagor in considera-
tion of the amount due upon the mortgage. At the same
time the mortgagor executed to the defendant, who had loaned
him the money wherewith to redeem the land, a mortgage to
secure the loan. Defendant's attorney, on examination of an
abstract of title, had reported the title in the first mortgagee,
on the supposition that the second mortgagee had been made
a party to the foreclosure suit, and the loan was made by
defendant in the belief that the second mortgage was cut off.
Under these circumstances, the court held that the defendant
should be subrogated to the rights of the first mortgagee, and
entitled to priority over the second mortgage.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has recently glorified
Sunday, itself by declaring that the running of an excur-
Work of sion train on Sunday is a work of necessity: Louis-
Necessity,
Excursion vile & N. R. Co. v. Comnionwcalth, 30 S. V. Rep.
Trains 878. But it very prudently abstains from giving
any reason why, other than that the company might deem it
necessary. It would have been wiser still to have refrained
from giving this.
The running of trains by a railroad company on Sunday is
within the prohibition of a statute which punishes any person
who labors in his calling on the Sabbath day, or employs his
servants in so doing, except in works of necessity or charity:
State v. Railroad CO., 24 W. Va. 783. This applies to rail-
roads engaged in interstate commerce, as well as to those
which carry on purely domestic traffic: State v. Railroad Co.,
24 W. Va. 783; Helnmington v. State, 90 Ga. 396; S. C., 17
S. E. Rep. ioo9, contra ; Norfolk & IK R. R. Co. v. Common-
wealth, (Va.) 13 S. E. Rep. 340.
According to the Supreme Court of New York, a name,
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such as " granite," used to designate a patented article, takes
upon it the same nature as the patent, becomes
Trade Mark,
Designation public property on the expiration of the patent,
of Patented and can be used by the public in connection with
Article
that article; and the manufacturer is not entitled
to the exclusive use of it thereafter, as a common law trade-
mark, though such might have been the case, if used in con-
nection with a non-patented article: St. Louis Staiping Co. v.
Piper, 33 N. Y. Suppi. 443.
Among the various absurd rules of the common law, to
which the courts still cling with a pertinacity like that of the
wills, drowning man in the proverb, is that which per-
Issue, mits the presumption of having issue to continue
Illegitimates, till the possibility of it, within the knowledge of
the medical profession, is long past. If, as Lord COKE asserts,
" the law seeth no impossibility of having children," when a
man and his wife are each of them one hundred years old,
then is the law not that perfection of human reason that some
would fain have us believe, but rather a certain agglomeration
of arbitrary rules designed more nicely for the accommoda-
tion of judges in the speedy determination of causes, than
for the exact furtherance of justice betwixt man and man.
Without discussing the propriety of the results obtained by
its application in some cases, which might be obtained equally
well in other ways, it may be said that the grossest injustice is
caused by its application to cases in which the word issue,
when used in reference to a woman physically incapable of
childbearing, who had no legitimate child, is yet held not to
include illegitimates, in the absence of other words in the will.
The latest instance of this is to be found in Flora v. Anderson,
66 Fed. Rep. 182, decided by the Circuit Court for the South-
em District of Ohio, Western District. One Longworth
devised part of his estate in trust for his daughter for life, with
remainder to the issue of her body surviving her. At the time-
the will was made the daughter had no legitimate issue, and
was nearly fifty years of age. After her death, one Flora,
alleged to be an illegitimate child of the said daughter, claimed
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the remainder. But the court held (i) That a devise to
"issue ' means thrwa facie legitimate issue, and an intention
to include illegitimates must appear from the will itself, with-
out resort to extrinsic evidence: (2) That it was conclusively.
presumed that it was possible that the daughter might have
issue at any time during her life: and therefore (3) That it was
not competent to prove that she was past the age of child-
-bearing when her father's will was made, for the purpose of
showing that her father must have had an illegitimate child in
view, in creating the remainder to her issue.
No intelligent man doubts that .such was the case; it is
hardly likely that the court itself doubted it; but ita lex
sciapta est; it is so much easier to stand on authority than to.
be independent, even if justice must thereby remain blind.
An adopted child is not "issue of the marriage," within the
Revocation, meaning of § 1298 of the Civil Code of California,
Adoption of providing that if a testator marry, and have issue
Child of such marriage, his former will is revoked: -fi
re Comassi's Estate, 40 Pac. Rep. 15.
The adoption of a child does not revoke an antecedent will
of the adopting parent, under the laws of Indiana: Davis v.
Fogle, 124 Ind. i ; S. C., 23 N. E. Rep. 86o.
